CIA OC HD 750830

The National Intelligence Daily

[redacted]

TOP SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
RUFF [redacted] UMBRA

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

Copy No. 134

[redacted] AUGUST 30, 1975 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 204 TCS 632/75

Portugal Awaits Anti-Communist Moves

The anti-Communist faction of Melo Antunes, which spearheaded the drive against Goncalves, has so far not responded to the appointment of Admiral Azevedo as Portugal's prime minister or to General Goncalves' being named armed forces chief of staff.

[redacted] however, that actions of the military in northern Portugal in the past two days may be seen as part of the Antunes group's strategy for gaining power. It is designed to start in the north, gather both military and civilian support, and gradually isolate Lisbon. The Antunes group claims to have near-total support in both the north and central military regions. Units elsewhere remain a question.

Yesterday, Central Military Region Commander Charais, who is a staunch supporter of the Antunes group and who could emerge as a strong man, issued a communique stating his units will guarantee that Portugal does not revert to a totalitarian regime and calling on the civilian population to give unequivocal support to his troops.

The communique and a letter signed by officers in Porto, demanding that General Corvacho not be reinstated as northern region commander as was decided by the Revolutionary Council earlier this week, were both seen as in keeping with the Antunes strategy.

The Antunes group, while admitting Admiral Azevedo is no Communist, sees him as weak and susceptible to manipulation. Azevedo, 58, is reportedly a close friend of President Costa Gomes and was named navy chief of staff five days after the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Caetano regime on April 25, 1974. He retained that post throughout the hectic 16 months that have followed—no mean task. He is described by many as having only limited influence in the navy, which is under the influence of more radical officers.

Admiral Azevedo

Azevedo clearly favors a leftist course although he is not as extreme in his views as Vasco Goncalves. The Admiral has not been unfavorable in his comments regarding the US and NATO. Returning

(See Portugal . . . Page 4)

Alert Memorandum on Portugal

A Step Closer to Civil War

The Daily today presents an Alert Memorandum, "Portugal: A Step Closer to Civil War," *prepared by CIA last night.*

We are concerned that Portugal moved a step closer to civil war yesterday with the appointments of Admiral Azevedo as prime minister and General Vasco Goncalves as armed forces chief of staff.

The anti-Communist faction of Melo Antunes must now decide either to try to overthrow this new arrangement—as it previously said it would—or forfeit any chance to change the direction in which the country is headed. The outcome also will have major implications for the future of the Azores and Madeira.

[redacted] even before the new appointments were announced, that the Melo Antunes group had already concluded that all of the possible solutions that were likely to emerge—including the appointment of Azevedo to succeed Goncalves—were unsatisfactory. A spokesman for the group claims it is "almost certain" it will set up headquarters in the north and:

- Openly declare its intent to rid the government and the military of all Communists.
- Demand the dismissal of the Revolutionary Council and the Goncalves government.

(See Portuguese . . . Page 4)

Lisbon Balks at Accord Using Indonesian Troops on Timor

Lisbon has balked at signing a tentative agreement with Jakarta which would have sent Indonesian forces into Timor to restore order. Portuguese concurrence would have provided Jakarta with the cloak of legitimacy it has been seeking for its imminent military move.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] CW-2641-100-4

Portuguese Alert Memorandum . . .

From Page 1

• Launch a military operation toward Lisbon to "push the Communists into the sea."

The group claims to have the support of General Carvalho, chief of the internal security forces.

These intentions are similar to a previous plan the Antunes group intended to implement if its August 7 manifesto was not accepted in four days. Antunes implicitly threatened a march on Lisbon on Tuesday when he announced he was going to Coimbra, headquarters of the Central Military Region. This trip never materialized.

In recent weeks it has appeared that the Portuguese propensity to procrastinate was endless, but at this juncture the Antunes group will probably have to move or give up any hope of directing Portugal's future. Goncalves' appointment is particularly objectionable to them, since Goncalves would be in an ideal position to purge them.

The first step in this process could come next week when the Armed Forces General Assembly meets to discuss the "revamping of the Revolutionary Council."

A military move to topple the regime will require more daring than Antunes and other anti-Goncalves officers have shown so far. They have information that the Communists and their allies include 15,000 well-armed supporters, which increases the likelihood of a confrontation turning into civil war.

Although Antunes is thought to have a majority of the military in his camp, it has never been clear whether this support extended to the use of violence. The performance of the military in previous crises would indicate that many of them could easily be convinced that the Azevedo government should be given time to prove itself.

Antunes' strongest support comes from General Charais, commander of the Central Military Region, whose troops have been on maneuvers all week and who has made strong statements about not letting Portugal fall under another totalitarian regime. The bulk of the military forces in the northern region are also thought to be pro-Antunes.

Reaction in both the Azores and Madeira to a move to oust the present government and carry out a purge of the Communists would be overwhelmingly favorable, both among the people and the islands' military.

We believe there is small likelihood that the independence movements in either place would immediately take advantage of the situation to make a unilateral declaration of independence if the Antunes group appeared to have a good chance of success. But if the tide turned against Antunes, or the struggle were protracted, such declarations could come swiftly, particularly in the Azores, where plans for such a contingency are further advanced. [redacted]

Portugal . . .

From Page 1

from a NATO meeting in Brussels where Spain's desire for some recognition from the Alliance had been a topic of discussion, Azevedo expressed pleasant surprise that the US abided by democratic rules and did not dominate the alliance.

Melo Antunes and his closest supporters may have committed themselves too far to turn back now, but the support they will attract to any effort to oust the new government will depend to some extent on aspects of President Costa Gomes' compromise package that have not yet been released. The make-up of the cabinet, for instance, and the government program adopted may affect the willingness of the less-committed to lend their support to an effort to change things by force. [redacted]

[redacted]